Recent Commission Action
and NoticesCASE SUMMARIES
Public Proceedings During 2008
Formal Complaints
FORMAL COMPLAINT NO. 81
Hon. Beverley Nettles-Nickerson
30th Circuit CourtOn May 16, 2007, the Judicial Tenure Commission initiated formal proceedings against Judge Nettles-Nickerson. The Formal Complaint alleged that Judge Nettles-Nickerson had filed a divorce complaint in Kent County Circuit Court fraudulently claiming that her husband was a resident of that county for at least ten days immediately preceding filing the divorce complaint when the judge knew her husband continued to reside in the former marital home in Ingham County. The complaint further alleged that Judge Nettles-Nickerson committed perjury when affirming under oath the facts of her husband’s alleged residence in the county during taking of the proofs for the divorce. In another allegation, the Commission alleged that the judge had submitted a false, fabricated email to the Commission purporting to show Judge Nettles-Nickerson had been on vacation a particular day when the judge was supposed to have been at the court.
The complaint also alleged that Judge Nettles-Nickerson had directed her court reporter to falsely inform the Chief Judge that the court reporter was getting breaks mandated by the union contract for court reporters. In another allegation, the Commission charged that Judge Nettles-Nickerson falsely accused Chief Judge William Collette of trying to develop an improper social relationship with her in statements to the judge’s husband and another judge at the court. The complaint also alleged that Judge Nettles-Nickerson had called a press conference and falsely accused Chief Judge William Collette and James Hughes, Region II Administrator for SCAO, of advocating termination of Judge Nettles-Nickerson’s court reporter and also falsely accusing them of filing complaints against the judge with the Tenure Commission. In another allegation, Judge Nettles-Nickerson was accused of pressuring court employees into listing cases on the No Progress Docket which did not meet the standards of MCR 2.502. The Commission further charged Judge Nettles-Nickerson was guilty of excessive absences, belated commencement of proceedings, untimely adjournments and improper docket management. The complaint also charged Judge Nettles-Nickerson with engaging in improper ex parte communications.
The complaint also alleged Judge Nettles-Nickerson had improperly discharged a criminal defendant from probation early because of the judge’s personal relationship with a court employee who was residing with the criminal defendant. The complaint further averred that Judge Nettles-Nickerson had discharged her Judicial Assistant in violation of the Whistleblower’s Protection Act and sought to cover-up the reasons for that dismissal. The complaint also charged Judge Nettles-Nickerson with making a series of racially-charged accusations against Judge William Collette, Region II Administrator for SCAO James Hughes and filing a spurious complaint against Judge Collette with the Michigan Civil Rights Commission alleging racial discrimination by Judge Collette.
The Michigan Supreme Court appointed the Honorable Leopold P. Borrello, retired Saginaw County Circuit Judge, as Master for the proceedings. Judge Borrello conducted more than eight weeks of hearings, which concluded on November 9, 2007. In his report to the Commission dated February 12, 2008, Master sustained seven of the ten counts in the Formal Complaint.
On March 10, 2008, oral argument on the Master’s Report took place before the Commission. On April 21, 2008, the Commission issued its Decision and Recommendation for Order of Discipline. The Commission adopted the Master’s Findings of Fact with two exceptions. The Commission concluded, as did the Master, that Respondent twice made false statements under oath in connection with her divorce proceeding (Count I), that Respondent made and solicited other false statements while not under oath including the submission of fabricated evidence to the Commission (Count II), that Respondent improperly listed cases on the No Progress Docket (Count III), that Respondent engaged in excessive absences, belated commencement of proceedings, untimely adjournments and improper docket management (Count IV), that Respondent allowed a social relationship to influence the release of a criminal defendant from probation (Count VI), and that Respondent recklessly flaunted her judicial office (Count IX). The Commission recommended Respondent be removed from office, conditionally suspended for a period of six years without pay if re-elected, and ordered to pay costs, fees and expenses of the Commission in the amount of $128,861.26. Two of the Commissioners dissented concerning the recommendation of a conditional suspension. One Commissioner dissented concerning the recommendation of a conditional suspension and also found the Examiner had proven only Counts I, II and III.
Oral argument was held before the Supreme Court on June 11, 2008. On June 13, 2008, the Supreme Court issued an opinion adopting in part recommendations made by the Commission and ordering that the Respondent be removed from office effective immediately. The Court accepted Commission findings with respect to Counts I, II, III, IV, VI and IX. The Court rejected that part of the Commission’s recommendation that Respondent be conditionally suspended. Justice Weaver concurred in the removal but dissented from the Court’s decision to assess $12,000 in costs against Respondent.
FORMAL COMPLAINT NO. 82
Hon. William Hultgren
19th District CourtThe Commission initiated formal proceedings against Judge Hultgren on July 10, 2007. It alleged in the formal complaint that, at the request of an acquaintance, the judge improperly intervened in a pending collection case not assigned to him, to assist a defendant who purportedly was a victim of mistaken identity. The Commission asserted that Respondent placed a telephone call to the plaintiff’s attorney on the defendant’s behalf. After a discussion with the attorney’s secretary, he sent a letter to the attorney by facsimile regarding the matter. The letter was on 19th District Court letterhead. The Commission alleges Respondent attempted to utilize his judicial office to have an impact on the result of the case, for the benefit of another.
In addition, the Commission asserted in the complaint that the judge assigned to the collection case learned of the intervention and raised the propriety of it in a memorandum to Respondent. In reply, Respondent issued a memorandum defending his conduct and making a demeaning reference to the plaintiff and his attorney by referring to them as a “lawyer in a credit card collection mill.”
On or about July 20, 2007, Respondent filed an answer denying that his actions constituted judicial misconduct. The Michigan Supreme Court appointed Hon. Norma Dotson-Sales, retired from the 36th District Court, as master for the proceedings. The formal hearing was held on November 27 and 28, 2007, before Judge Dotson-Sales. In her report to the Commission, dated March 31, 2008, the master concluded that Respondent’s actions did not constitute misconduct, as the judge was acting to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
The Commission held a public hearing on May 12, 2008. It thereafter rejected the master’s conclusions, and issued a decision and recommendation to the Supreme Court that Respondent’s actions constituted misconduct. The Commission recommended to the Supreme Court that Respondent be sanctioned by public censure and a 60-day suspension, without pay. Two Commissioners dissented as to the sanction only, as they believed Respondent’s conduct warranted a public censure and one-year suspension without pay.
Oral argument before the Supreme Court took place on October 2, 2008. On December 17, 2008, the Supreme Court issued an opinion rejecting the Commission’s recommendations, and adopting the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the master. The Court concluded that in its judgment, Respondent did not commit misconduct, but in fact, his actions under the circumstances reflected poor judgment. It cautioned the judge to more carefully conform his actions to the rules and provisions that guide judicial conduct. A concurring/dissenting opinion agreed that Respondent’s actions did not warrant a 60-day suspension, but noted that they did constitute judicial misconduct, and an admonition was an appropriate sanction in the case.
FORMAL COMPLAINT NO. 83
HON. MARY BROUILLETTE BARGLIND
41st District CourtThe Commission initiated formal proceedings against Judge Barglind on February 12, 2008. It alleged in the formal complaint that the judge engaged in a pattern of misconduct concerning an extended delay in rendering decisions in matters submitted to her, and her failure to cooperate and comply with the State Court Administrative Office (“SCAO”). The matters concerning SCAO relate to her failure to respond to inquiries regarding the status of undecided matters, the failure to report matters as pending as required under the Michigan Court Rules, and her failure to comply with the terms of an Implementation Plan designed to address certain administrative matters in the court.
On March 14, 2008, Respondent filed an answer denying that her actions constituted misconduct and asserting affirmative defenses. The Supreme Court appointed Judge Patricia Micklow, retired from the 96th District Court, as master for the proceedings. Prior to the commencement of a hearing, the Executive Director and Respondent entered into a settlement agreement, where the judge consented to findings of misconduct and to a recommended discipline.
On July 14, 2008, the Commission issued a decision and recommendation to the Supreme Court based on that consent. The bases for the decision included Respondent’s acts of delay in rendering decisions or resolving matters in 12 different cases, for various periods up to 32 months, and failure to respond to written and telephone inquiries by SCAO as to the status of outstanding decisions. On 14 occasions, the judge also failed to include pending decisions on reports to SCAO, as required by MCR 8.107. Finally, Respondent did not comply with certain terms of an “Implementation Plan” developed to address delay and other administrative issues in the court.
On September 17, 2008, the Michigan Supreme Court adopted the decision and recommendation of the Commission, and suspended Respondent for 30 days without pay.
By consent without Formal Complaints
Hon. Norene S. Redmond
38th District CourtOn July 20, 2007, the Judicial Tenure Commission issued a Decision and Recommendation to the Michigan Supreme Court that Hon. Norene S. Redmond, of the 38th District Court, be publicly censured. The allegations included demonstrating a severe attitude toward witnesses, engaging in a pattern of setting grossly excessive bail amounts and a “persistent failure to treat persons fairly and courteously.”
In one case, a teen-ager called 911 after his mother hit him with a belt on the arm. His mother was uncooperative and was arrested for domestic violence and resisting arrest. Judge Redmond set bond for the defendant in the amount of $5000/10%. After the defendant had been removed, and was awaiting the payment of the $500 bond by her parents, her teen-aged son made a derogatory comment about the judge in the hallway, out of the judge’s presence. An officer advised the judge of the remark and she raised the defendant’s bond to $25,000 cash or surety.
In two other cases, Judge Redmond set bond at $750,000 and $1,000,000 for two defendants facing charges of embezzlement from a vulnerable adult and larceny for taking approximately $800 from the premises of a 90-year-old woman and charging her $3,000, an excessive amount for a paint job.
In a fourth case, Judge Redmond sentenced an unrepresented 23-year-old veterinary technician, who was ticketed after a party guest talked loudly or yelled into a cell phone on the defendant’s front porch at 4:00 a.m., to probation terms which included, but were not limited to, 30 days in jail, 100 hours of community service and daily alcohol tests. The judge permitted neighbors who were in the courtroom to complain, interrupt the defendant and joined in herself. The judge also failed to disclose she knew some of the neighbors, one of whom had been arrested the same night for disorderly conduct.
Judge Redmond consented to the Commission’s findings of fact and recommendation for discipline. On February 6, 2008, the Supreme Court issued an order a public censure of Hon. Norene S. Redmond, of the 38th District Court, based on the Commission’s Decision and Recommendation, with the consent of Judge Redmond. On November 4, 2008, Judge Redmond was defeated in her bid for reelection to the 38th District Court.
Hon. Catherine Bove Steenland
39th District CourtOn October 13, 2008, the Judicial Tenure Commission issued a Decision and Recommendation to the Michigan Supreme Court that the Hon. Catherine Bove Steenland be publicly censured and suspended from exercising her judicial duties for a period of 90 days without pay. It alleged that Judge Steenland had driven a motor vehicle while intoxicated and had subsequently pled guilty to and was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while visibly impaired.
Judge Steenland consented to the Commission’s Findings of Fact and Recommendation for Discipline. On December 8, 2008, the Supreme Court issued an order which publicly censured and suspended the Honorable Catherine Bove Steenland without pay for 90 days.
Non-Public Dispositions In 2008The Commission resolved matters through letters of explanation, caution, or admonishment to a number of judges for actions such as the conduct described below. Although these letters are confidential and part of the non-public domain, the Commission summarizes many of them here, without reference to the judge or court, for the edification of the public and the judiciary.
Treatment of others while acting in a judicial capacity
Demonstrating anger and publicly belittling and humiliating police and prosecutors when a complaining witness failed to appear, requiring them to remain in court after the case was dismissed to listen to jurors state what they would have been doing had they not come to court, initiating arguments at the police department and yelling and insulting various officers. The Commission found the judge to have violated Canons 2A, 2B, 3A(3) and 3A(9) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Disregarding a defendant’s legal rights and due process in taking a plea and failing to advise the defendant of his right to appeal. The judge admitted the transcript lacked clarity and coherence, that a better plea should have been taken, that he should have elicited the word “guilty” and that he had failed to advise the defendant of his right to appeal. The Commission stressed the need to be more attentive to a person’s rights, and to avoid taking procedural or due process shortcuts, notwithstanding the fairness or leniency of the end result.
Reacting angrily and excessively toward the defendant’s attorney after he brought a motion for disqualification due to the judge having made negative remarks reflecting bias about the defendant’s occupation prior to his murder trial; and refusing to modify an improper verdict form. The Commission noted that the judge’s reaction to the motion contributed to a greater appearance of bias than would have occurred had she not treated the attorney’s concern as a personal affront and remained less emotional. The Commission also expressed concern about the use of a verdict form which did not conform to the standard form, as the only one place it provided for the jury to return a “Not Guilty” verdict was for the Count of Murder in the first degree.
Absenteeism
Excessive absenteeism in 2007 and early 2008. The Commission determined that the judge’s absences from court (37% in 2007, and 51% in early 2008) were not justified by the judge’s explanations. The judge often missed court at the last minute (causing hardship on her staff and all involved in matters on the docket), and regularly prioritized personal matters over judicial duties and the interests of parties, witnesses, victims, and families. Two additional absences taken for “professional education” were also improper, as they clearly involved matters for the judge’s personal enrichment, and not a role as a judicial officer. In considering this matter, the Commission took into account the fact that the judge’s rate of absence from court decreased significantly after the first few months of 2008.
Treatment of others while acting in an administrative capacity
Lack of civility between the judge and other members of his court and failure to improve the relationship between himself, court staff, members of the bar and parties with business in the court. The judge was also advised of the need to be more circumspect in dealing with female court employees and to be careful in making casual remarks which unnecessarily offended and which could readily be avoided.
Failure to promptly return court files to the clerk’s office, as directed by the Chief Judge. The making of too many errors when making entries on the Register of Actions in cases and in filling out Bindover Sheets for preliminary examinations, causing problems in the clerk’s office and transmission of files between the judge’s courtroom and the clerk’s office to be straightened out. The ignoring of directions from the Chief Judge to personally sign orders of dismissal in the case of deceased individuals, rather than affixing a stamped signature. The Commission also expressed its disapproval of the manner in which the judge adopted a dress code for persons appearing in his court, without notifying court administration and posting a “bare bones” sign on the courtroom door about proper attire being required when there was no real notice to the affected public of what specific clothing was required or accepted.
Unnecessary screaming or yelling in dealing with parties, attorneys or other persons appearing in court. The Commission expressed its encouragement over the judge’s recognition of the need to exercise greater restraint.
Lack of civility and personal and professional conflict between judge and fellow judge; tendency to gossip, express hostility toward fellow judge, and share inappropriate information with court staff; placing court employees in the middle of conflict, causing high levels of stress and tension at the court. The Commission required the judge to meet with the Executive Director, Regional State Court Administrator and fellow judge. The judge voiced a commitment to modify his conduct for the good of the staff and the court.
Occasional lapses of control and excessive anger causing staff to be fearful and tense; personal and professional conflict with fellow judge; and placing court staff in the middle of conflict, contributing to high levels of stress and tension at the court. The Commission required the judge to meet with the Executive Director, Regional State Court Administrator and fellow judge. The judge expressed willingness to address issues such as her pettiness and excessive anger directed at court employees, and an intent to improve relations with the staff and her fellow judge.
Failure to treat prospective juror in respectful manner. A prospective juror asserted that she could not meet her obligation to serve on a jury, as she could not obtain child care for her infant son after the initial day of trial (when the prospective juror was chosen, but selection had not been completed). The judge refused to release the individual from jury service. The next day, the prospective juror appeared in court with her child. The Commission noted that the judge had several avenues available to address the situation, including contempt. Instead, the judge appointed an attorney to represent the prospective juror, and held a “back-room” meeting where the judge suggested the possibility of reporting the individual to “child protective services” for bringing her son to court. The Commission viewed that conduct as an improper threat. Although the Commission noted that the judge had the discretion to determine that the individual had an obligation to serve, and it was improper for the individual to appear with her child in court, it determined that the judge’s reaction to the situation was untenable.
Negative comments to attorney made on the record. The judge was disturbed about an attorney’s conduct during a trial, and made negative comments on the record to that attorney both during the trial and at subsequent proceedings. The Commission noted that a judge is required to be dignified and courteous to lawyers when acting in an official capacity. Further, assuming some criticism of the attorney was warranted, the Commission concluded it should have been done in chambers instead of on the record.
Misuse of judicial authority
Misuse of judicial position for political and personal reasons and denial of due process related to termination of court employee, excessively interfering with employee’s attempts to obtain unemployment benefits, and using the local police department for the court’s private investigation. The Commission expressed concern the judge may have compromised impartiality and integrity in the matter, motivated by the political interests of others.
Engaging in retaliatory conduct against the police department such as dismissing traffic cases with the excuse “officer unavailable” when the officer was available or could be within minutes in retaliation for police criticism. The Commission noted the judge took every opportunity to abuse her judicial office to grandstand and promote her own political and personal agendas and that her abusive and retaliatory tactics were prejudicial to the administration of justice and eroded the public’s confidence in the dignity, integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Using prestige of office to interfere in police investigation. During a police investigation of a domestic altercation and alleged violation of a Personal Protection Order, the judge appeared at the scene, approached the investigating officers, identified herself as a judge, and named the court where she worked. The judge was a friend of the purported victim, and attempted to direct the officers to take certain acts in relation to their investigation and to arrest the accused. The Commission determined that the judge intended to intervene in the investigation when she had no authority to do, and use her status as a judge in an effort to influence the investigating officers.
Ex parte communication
Contacting the chief judge ex parte when the judge knew he would have to hear the appeal of her denial of a disqualification motion, then misrepresenting on the record that the chief judge agreed with her decision to deny the motion.
While continuing to act as judge in a matter in which the judge was romantically involved with one party, the Commission noted ex parte contact undoubtedly occurred, and at the very least the circumstances of the relationship created the appearance that improper ex parte contact occurred.
Allowing certain relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment
Signing orders in a matter in which the judge was romantically involved with one of the parties, who was also a court employee. The Commission was appalled by the judge’s poor judgment and exhorted him to be more cautious when signing documents placed before him, and his relationships with court employees or others who have a case pending before the court.
Being influenced by certain persons or relationships the judge wished to placate resulting in the inappropriate handling of an investigation and termination of a court employee.
Disqualification
Failing to disqualify in a matter assigned to the judge, who was romantically involved with the court employee who was a party in the matter.
Denying a motion for disqualification brought due to the judge’s biased, negative comments about the defendant’s occupation, then falsely claiming the chief judge agreed with the judge’s decision to deny the motion.
Lack of candor
Providing inconsistent responses to the Commission which were also at odds with judge’s prior deposition and trial testimony.
Misrepresenting aspects of relationship and awareness of legal matters pertaining to romantic partner who was a party before the judge, in responses to the Commission.
Delay
Failure to render decision for 18 months. The judge originally scheduled oral argument regarding a motion for relief from judgment in a criminal proceeding, but later determined the matter would be decided on briefs. A decision was drafted when the motion was pending for 13 months. Although some of that delay was not attributable to the judge, there was a failure by the judge to promptly attend to the matter when the motion was ready for a decision. Further, after it was discovered (when the motion was pending for 17 months) that the “final draft decision” had not been entered or issued to the parties, the judge failed to assign a high priority to the resolution of the matter. The judge also failed to report the case as pending on a report submitted to SCAO pursuant to MCR 8.107.
Failure to render decision in several cases for periods between two and 12 months. The judge engaged in delay in rendering a number of decisions. Although some of the cases were at issue during a period when the judge was suffering from health problems, the Commission noted that the judge had been dealing with the physical difficulties for some time. It determined that if the judge chose to continue to serve in a judicial capacity, there was an ongoing duty to meet the obligations of the office. There was evidence that the judge had taken steps to resolve challenges presented by the health issue, and eliminated the extended delays in resolving cases. The judge also failed to list two of the matters as pending on her report to SCAO, filed pursuant to MCR 8.107.
Allowing motion referred to referee to remain pending for 11 months. The judge took close to two months to refer a matter to a referee for a recommendation, and later failed to monitor the matter so that it remained pending with the referee for nine additional months. The Commission reminded the judge that even though a matter is referred to a referee for consideration, the judge still has an obligation to track cases and insist on their prompt resolution.
Failure to schedule and conduct trials in a timely manner, including after remand from appellate courts. The Commission concluded that in several cases, even though delays were attributable to matters outside of the judge’s control (such as appeals), the judge failed to monitor cases and insure that they were resolved without unwarranted delay once they were returned to the judge’s docket. On one occasion, a higher court issued a remand order resolving a disputed issue but not the entire case. The next proceeding was not scheduled by the judge until nine months later. The Commission noted that the age of a case is not measured merely by the time it remains on the judge’s docket, and the entire period a case has been pending (including when it is on appeal) should be considered when prioritizing cases for scheduling purposes.
Failure to timely file 6C Financial Report with State Court Administrative Office. The judge belatedly filed a financial report almost six months after it was due even though she was aware of the filing of the grievance and her comment had been invited concerning this matter. The judge also had a history of consistently filing her MCR 8.107 Reports late. The Commission had previously urged the judge to timely file her 8.107 Reports without taking any action on a prior occasion. The Commission indicated it was encouraged by the fact that the judge had now adopted a system to keep abreast of filing dates.
Failure to timely file MCR 8.107 Reports concerning matters under advisement and the Annual Financial Report required by Canon 6C of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The judge acknowledged repeatedly failing to timely file such reports beginning with his ascension to the bench and continued to recent dates. The Commission rejected the judge’s claim that the State Court Administrative Office’s acceptance of untimely filings condoned the belated filings. The Commission further rejected the judge’s assertion that the burden of responding to grievances contributed to or made it difficult to timely file reports with the SCAO. The Commission stated it was relying on the judge’s assurance of future compliance with MCR 8.107 and Canon 6 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Taking over a year to decide a post-trial motion to modify custody. The Commission recognized that some of the delay might be attributable to it being a highly contentious case. However, the Commission noted that judges had an affirmative duty to “dispose promptly of the business of the court,” pursuant to Canon 3A(5) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The amount of time before resolution of the case was unacceptably long under the circumstances.
Holding a motion for summary disposition under advisement over 18 months before rendering a decision. The judge ignored repeated inquiries from the Commission’s Executive Director and only decided the matter after being sent a 28-day letter. The Commission noted the applicability of Administrative Order 2003-7 contemplating that matters submitted to a judge should be decided no later than 35 days after submission and Canon 3A (5) of the Code of Judicial Conduct providing that judges should promptly dispose of the business of the court.
Docket Management
Failure to commence proceedings at scheduled time, and backlog of cases. The judge regularly scheduled trials for 9:00 a.m., but when arriving in court, attended to other matters while those involved in the trial waited (on some occasions as long as an hour and a half) to begin the trial proceedings. In addition, the judge repeatedly developed a backlog of cases, resulting in intervention by court administration to address the issue. The Commission acknowledged the judge’s adoption of several recommendations to increase productivity, which appeared to have assisted in the judge reducing the number of unresolved cases.
Failure to track cases and resolve pending matters promptly, particularly in post-judgment divorce cases. The judge maintained a policy of intervention in post-judgment disputes by meetings with the parties (with the consent of all involved). However, that frequently extended the period the dispute remained at issue, and resulted in repeated appearances instead of prompt resolutions. The Commission noted the inefficiency in the system utilized by the judge, and directed that further application must be conducted under specified guidelines to obtain the timely resolution of the pending matter. The Commission also required the judge to attend a case flow management class to assist in the control of his docket, and to submit monthly reports of unresolved matters to monitor the effectiveness of the judge’s efforts.
Failure to track matters taken under advisement. The judge did not maintain a system to track matters taken under advisement, which resulted in a failure to render decisions in a timely manner, and on one occasion the issuance of two opinions (with differing results) on one motion. The Commission acknowledged that the problems were complicated by the assignment of additional cases in a re-organization of case assignments among judges, and some ongoing physical ailments of the judge (which the judge represented were no longer having an impact on the ability to tend to judicial obligations). The Commission directed the judge to take the necessary action to develop a system to track cases and issue decisions in a timely manner as required under the Michigan Court Rules.
Backlog of cases, number of preliminary conferences, and notice regarding absences. The judge frequently had a significant backlog of cases pending over time standards, which resulted in intervention by court administration. The Commission acknowledged that figures over recent months reflected that the backlog had decreased, and encouraged the judge to continue efforts to resolve matters within time standards. In that regard, the Commission suggested that at times it may be better for the judge place additional emphasis on proceeding to trial rather than conducting preliminary conferences, as the number taking place in cases before the judge seemed to have an impact on their resolution.
On at least three occasions, a judge only gave two or three weeks notice for vacations. The Commission directed the judge to give sufficient notice to court staff of absences, so it could avoid scheduling proceedings on those dates, and those involved in scheduled trials were not burdened with rescheduling multiple trials. The judge also failed to provide advance notice to counsel of late arrivals due to doctor appointments, resulting in attorneys and parties waiting long periods for the judge to arrive. The Commission advised the judge that court staff should be instructed to schedule court proceedings to allow for appointments, so those involved were not waiting in court for the judge’s arrival.
Scheduling numerous matters for the court’s morning session, which were not heard until the afternoon, contributing to unnecessary delay and frustration for parties. In a similar manner, far too often inmates were brought from the county jail, kept waiting for hours in the court’s holding facility and belatedly processed, if at all that day. The Commission also expressed its disapproval of the practice of mass arraignments of misdemeanor defendants, which contributed to confusion or delay.
Misuse of court resources
Use of court resources for judicial campaigns. The Commission determined that the judge’s listing of court contact information on a Statement of Organization Form for a judicial election campaign was improper, even though the judge noted there were problems receiving communications from the Michigan Bureau of Elections using other addresses in the past, and was ultimately unopposed in the election. In addition, the judge erred when permitting the court fax number to be utilized on a temporary basis for another individual’s campaign for office, as no other fax number was available. The Commission noted that there was no exception for those scenarios in the Michigan Campaign Finance Act. The Commission acknowledged the judge’s representation that, in the future, similar conduct would not occur.
Failure to cooperate with Commission
The judge ignored repeated attempts by the Executive Director to contact him concerning when a decision would be rendered on a motion. This conduct violated MCR 9.208(B) requiring cooperation with the Commission.
Contempt of Court
Improper threat to find court employee in contempt of court. There was delay in obtaining a jury panel for the judge’s courtroom. The judge confronted a court employee who was involved in providing a jury and threatened them with contempt of court if there were further delay. The Commission advised the judge that casual invocation of the court’s contempt power was inappropriate. The Commission also noted that timely provision of a jury panel was an administrative issue to be addressed by court administration, not by ordinary court employees.
Interference with attorney-client relationship
Initiating inappropriate conversations with defense counsel. The judge approached counsel representing a defendant charged with reckless driving and indicated the client should have been charged with operating while intoxicated under established policy in the county given the client’s blood alcohol level. The judge expressed concern about whether the client would plead guilty to the charged offense or would plead down to a still lesser offense. The Commission advised the judge that this was not a general discussion about policy as he perceived it. The attorney had nothing to do with determining the standards for filing criminal charges. As counsel, the attorney had an ethical obligation to zealously represent her client and obtain the best possible result. The Commission informed the judge that his statements, whether intended or not, gave the impression of pressuring counsel to neglect the duty to her client and plead him guilty to the charged offense rather than a lesser offense as part of a plea bargain.